Pastoralists rely on networks of cooperating households containing relatives and others to help with production and various other daily activities. To understand how socioecological differences and commonalities affect different social networks, we compared cooperative decision-making using gift games for 755 people working in herding groups across six sites in two countries (Saami areas in Norway and Tibetan areas in China). We found that members of the same herding group received more gifts from each other. Most variance in gift-giving between study sites was due to differences in the effects of relatedness. Tibetan herders were more likely than Saami herders to give gifts to closer relatives belonging to geographically distant herding groups. Also, stated reasons of giving gifts were different in the two societies: kin and wealth (measured by herd size) were more important among Tibetan pastoralists, while reciprocity was more important among Saami. Social ties within and beyond the family as well as the centrality of herding groups within social networks are general patterns of social organization favoring cooperation among pastoralists.
Introduction
Empirical studies of social evolution in humans have shown how cooperative interactions among kin of varying degree, as well as non-kin, are shaped in part by social and ecological contexts (Henrich et al. 2005; Ruffle and Sosis 2006; Cronk 2007; Herrmann et al. 2008; Buchan et al. 2009; Lamba and Mace 2011; Prediger et al. 2011; Apicella et al. 2012; Balliet and Van Lange 2013; Gerkey 2013; Leibbrandt et al. 2013; Silva and Mace 2014; Wu et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2016 ; Thomas et al. 2018) . Previous studies have found more between-group than within-group variability in cooperativeness, where Bgroups^can refer to societies in different countries (Henrich et al. 2005) , ethnic groups in the same country (Wu et al. 2015) , or villages and camps within a single ethnic group (Lamba and Mace 2011; Apicella et al. 2012) . Researchers disagree about the extent to which this variation is driven by differences in market integration and stable society-wide cultural norms (Henrich et al. 2005) or more localized differences in demography (Lamba and Mace 2011; Smith et al. 2016 ) and/or different expectations of trust and fairness (Gurven et al. 2008) .
Assortment is fundamental for cooperation to evolve, and social networks are shaped by individuals clustering on a number of dimensions, including reciprocal benefits, shared genes, reputations, need, economic condition, or the Bmarket value^of potential social partners (Nowak and May 1992; Fletcher and Doebeli 2009; Allen et al. 2017 ). Disruptions to socioecological systems can have unforetold consequences on social networks, especially for smaller-scale societies whose members rely on flexible cooperative interactions with others to survive and thrive: a pertinent example being pastoralists. Pastoralists often find themselves socially marginalized in nation states and tend to inhabit arid or marginalized areas not well-suited to farming. Many herders are experiencing challenges due to climate change, pasture fragmentation, changes in land tenure, globalization, and threats to their way of life. Although strategies of subsisting on herd animals have existed in various forms for thousands of years (Honeychurch and Makarewicz 2016) , little is known about the patterns and processes of contemporary pastoralist cooperation in different socioecological contexts.
Pastoralists around the world tend to organize their labor in cooperative herding groups (Naess 2012) . These groups are typically formed of several related households, allowing herders to pool risk, achieve economies of scale, and survive in otherwise uncertain environments, while also facilitating communication, monitoring, and sanctioning (Mace 1998; Naess et al. 2010; Aktipis et al. 2011; Naess 2012) . Within their social networks, pastoralists rely on herding groups whose members are made up of kin and non-kin (Thomas et al. 2015) ; these groups often include close kin, suggesting a role for inclusive fitness benefits, possibly as a by-product of assortment regardless of direct cooperative interactions.
Pastoralist groups in eastern Africa have developed norms allowing those in need to freely borrow livestock from herding partners with a surplus of animals, without obligations to repay (Cronk 2007) ; others leverage their friendship networks to recruit raiding partners (Glowacki et al. 2016) .
Saami herders in Norway and herders on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau (QTP) in China utilize similar social institutions: cooperative groups-called siida in the Saami languages (Paine 1994) and ru skor among Tibetan herders in QTP (Nietupski 2012 )-that collaborate on herding tasks and share pastures at certain times of year. But there are also differences in two sites in terms of how these institutions are formed. In Norway, a siida consists of one or more license owners and is a cooperative herding group, traditionally consisting of several related families (although kinship is not a necessary criterion for membership). Siidas are grouped into districts: formal administration units defined by the government (Thomas et al. 2016) . In China, members of the same ru skor are often related because brothers who establish new households tend to stay in the same group. Several ru skor will form a production group (called sheng chan dui in Chinese (Yamaguchi 2011) ), usually below the village level, but herding and daily life activities are mostly clustered within ru skor. Pastoralism in Saami areas of Norway and on the QTP varies greatly in scale and extent. Reindeer herding encompasses approximately 120,000 km 2 (> 40% of mainland Norway), with a little over 3000 herders owning~250,000 reindeer (Anonymous 2016 ). There are around 5 million Tibetan herders owning 12 million yaks and 30 million goats and sheep, with over 1.6 million km 2 of rangelands (~64% of QTP in China; see Naess 2016 and Supplementary Information (SI) Text).
Organization of winter pastures in Finnmark, Norway, shifted in the late 1970s from a customary land tenure system to a common system; today, winter pastures are in the process of becoming privatized or semi-privatized. Following the Reindeer Husbandry Law of 1933, reindeer herding in Finnmark was formally (and physically) separated into different summer districts: pasture areas that can consist of several summer siidas, bounded by fences. In contrast, winter pastures are currently being reorganized primarily through establishing fixed winter siida grazing boundaries and user rules (Naess 2017) . Rangelands on the QTP were leased to households starting in the early 1990s, based on the number of inhabitants and are enclosed by fences. By the end of 2003, around 70% of China's usable rangeland was leased through long-term contracts, where 68% was contracted to individual households and the rest to groups of households or to villages, although estimates vary (Naess 2013) . In the study area, winter pastures were first contracted to individual households whereas the summer pastures were contracted to a maximum of three households (Cao et al. 2013 ). There are also households grazing separately from others, both in winter and summer areas; the preference for herding alone rather than in groups has been increasing since privatization was introduced.
To investigate variation in cooperative herding behavior within and between the two countries, we analyzed cooperative behavior from individual herders working in herding groups within six study sites. Our data encompasses 212 reindeer herders in 33 siidas across summer and winter districts within two zones in Finnmark, northern Norway and 1192 yak herders from 172 ru skors in four villages in Maqu county, in the eastern part of QTP, China. Henceforth, we will refer to these districts in Norway and villages in China as our Bstudy sites^(or Bsites^). We employed a gift allocation task to reveal the structure of existing social relationships, similar to those used in studies of groups of hunter-gatherers (Apicella et al. 2012; Chaudhary et al. 2015) and pastoralists (Thomas et al. 2015; Glowacki et al. 2016) . In these gift games, participants anonymously distributed gifts to at least one other person (see BMethods^).
Studies to date have not analyzed cross-cultural variation in cooperation among populations following similar subsistence strategies and social organization, but where there are differences in country-level social, political, and ecological contexts. To address this gap, we examine variation in cooperative behavior within and between groups of pastoralists living in Norway and China. The main aim of this study is to understand cross-cultural variation in cooperation among herders in Norway and China as well as the causes of variation by investigating patterns of gift-giving. Since previous studies found that herders gave gifts to social partners who were members of their own herding group and/or relatives (Thomas et al. 2015) , we expect that, across all sites, members of the same herding group will be preferentially chosen as gift recipients, especially when those members are relatives. Nevertheless, considering the differences in pasture organization, we expect that the spatial constraints and shared borders in Finnmark necessitate higher levels of between-group cooperation and coordination to ameliorate issues such as mixing of herds, compared to the situation on QTP. Moreover, due to the individualized pasture situation on the QTP, we expect that kinship is a more important determinant for gift-giving than group membership compared to Finnmark. In addition, previous studies have also found that herders gave gifts to people reputed to be highquality partners, young people new to the lifestyle (Thomas et al. 2015) , or people who were high status in terms of wealth and leadership (Glowacki et al. 2016) or other social skills . Consequently, we also explore the similarities and differences in terms of stated reasons of gift-giving between sites as well as how herding success, measured as herd size (Naess 2010) , influences gift-giving between sites.
Methods
MGT conducted fieldwork in Karasjok, Norway, in July and August 2013 and in Kautokeino, Norway, in June-August 2016, employing local assistants to aid in interviews and translation. Participants were adult reindeer herders of any gender. JD conducted research in QTP, China, in July-October 2016, employing three local assistants to help in translation and field work. In each site, we asked adult male and female herders to play economic games following a demographic questionnaire. Kinship networks were created in slightly different ways in the different sites: see SI for details. To minimize observer bias, blinded methods were used when all behavioral data were recorded and analyzed.
Gift games
Participants were endowed with a fixed gift and were asked to give everything away to at least one other person; they were not allowed to keep anything for themselves. Herders in QTP and Karasjok, Finnmark, could give their gifts to a maximum of three people; there was no limit in Kautokeino, but the median number of gifts given away was two (the maximum given by any one herder was seven gifts). In Finnmark, participants could only give gifts to licensed herders within their district (siidaandeler; in English meaning siida-share or, effectively, heads of households). In China, participants could give to anybody in the same site, except people in their own household. See SI Text for further discussion.
Participants in Norway were presented with a list of names of license owners in their district, with associated anonymous ID numbers; the ID numbers of their chosen recipients were recorded. In China, we asked participants to name any members of the same site that they wish to give gifts to; we also asked for the recipients' other information, e.g., name of his/ her family head, to avoid any mistakes, as locals are likely to share the same name.
Participants in China were endowed with 15 yuan ($4.33 purchasing power parity [PPP] in July 2015); herders in Karasjok, Norway, were given vouchers representing 15 l of petrol (225 Norwegian kroner; $24.92 PPP in July 2013); and herders in Kautokeino, Norway, were endowed with 35 l in petrol vouchers (525 NOK; $52.34 PPP in July 2016). PPP amounts were calculated from the OECD's indicators for the relevant years and countries (OECD 2017); see Table S1 . In addition to the game endowments, we also gave small gifts to each person as compensation for their participation: in China, we gave them sweets or laundry powder; in Norway, participants in Kautokeino received 300 NOK; and participants in Karasjok received 150 NOK. Gift game participants were also asked to report their reasons for giving gifts as an open-ended question. At the end of each field season in Norway and China, participants in Karajok and QTP were paid in cash, while those in Kautokeino were paid by bank transfer. Payments included participation fees.
An individual's position in their social network, as measured by indirect ties (e.g., friends of friends), has been associated with benefits including increased reproductive success (Brent 2015; Page et al. 2017) . We quantified social network position in terms of individuals' betweenness and eigenvector centrality (Table S2) ; higher betweenness scores mean that an individual acts as a bridge or broker between otherwise unconnected people, while higher eigenvector centrality means that individuals are connected to other well-connected people (Brent 2015) . We also estimated modularity-a measure of how a network can be partitioned into communities (Newman 2006; Fortunato 2010) .
Statistical analyses
To analyze gift decisions, we fit Bayesian multilevel logistic regressions with varying intercepts for gift game participants nested within study sites. The predictors were coefficient of relatedness, a binary variable representing whether or not a pair of herders (dyad) were membership of the same herding group, and an interaction between these two (see BModel specificationŝ ection in Supplementary Information). This model structure allows us to estimate site-level effects as well as control for the non-independence of potential gift givers in dyads (Gelman et al. 2013; McElreath 2016) ; similar model structures have been used in previous studies employing gift games (Apicella et al. 2012; Thomas et al. 2015) . A subset of models also included varying slopes for sites in order to estimate the different effects of relatedness and group membership between areas (Schielzeth and Forstmeier 2009; McElreath 2016) .
For the analysis of how herding success affects decisions to give gifts, we used herd size as an indicator of herding success; this has been used by other researchers as a reliable indicator of pastoralist production and family wealth (Roth 1996; Naess 2010) . Since the most important source of income is from livestock, herding size is a reliable measure of herding success. Herd size was calculated from self-stated information or from government documents. We fitted Bayesian multilevel linear regressions with varying intercepts for study site to predict herd size z scores (see Table S2 for specifications). Herd sizes were standardized to mean = 0 over 1 standard deviation, grouped within sites, to allow direct comparison across countries given the order of magnitude difference in livestock ownership (Fig. S5 ).
All models were run for 2000 iterations, discarding the first half as warm-up. We fitted one chain for models of gift-giving (due to the computational and temporal constraints of fitting such complex models to a large dataset) and four chains for the social network analysis. We checked thatR scores (the potential scale reduction factor, measuring convergence of chains) were close to 1.0; they were in all cases.
For model selection in both regression analyses, we compared the approximate leave-one-out cross-validation information criteria )-an estimate of out-of-samplepredictive fit-and calculated model weights by stacking posterior predictive distributions (Yao et al. 2017) ; in both cases, we selected the model carrying most weight for analyses presented here. All models were fitted in R 3.3 (R Core Team 2012) using the packages rstanarm (R Core Team 2012) and loo Yao et al. 2017) ; social network statistics were calculated with iGraph (Csardi and Nepusz 2006) . See SI Text for details of model specifications.
Results
In total, 755 participants gave a total of 1214 gifts (Table 1; note that the differences in sample size between countries are partly due to differences in population sizes and scale of the herding lifestyle, as well as different lengths of field seasons spent in each country). Models of the gift networks include only the gift game players as Begos^(i.e., potential givers) but all the other members of the same site as Balters,^producing 219,112 within-site dyads. There were 28-60 winter herding groups in the four Tibetan sites, 24 winter herding groups in one Saami site, and 9 summer herding groups in the other.
Herders in Finnmark gave 74.1% of their 147 gifts to members of the same herding group, while herders in Tibet gave 40.6% of 1067 gifts to members of the same group (Fig. S1 ). In Norway, the average amount received was $10.61 PPP; the maximum amount received by any one herder was $122.13 PPP. The average amount received in China was $2.38 PPP, with the maximum amount received being $33.18 PPP. Table S1 summarizes gifts by site.
Siidas and ru skor were composed of at least first cousins (r ≥ 0.125) as well as non-kin (Fig. S2 ). In the Tibetan sites, approximately equal numbers of close kin (grandparents, parents, siblings, and children; r ≥ 0.25) belonged to other herding groups, whereas few close family members worked for other groups in Finnmark. Proportionally more gifts were given to non-kin on the QTP than to kin (range across the four sites, 61.5-70.5%) and in Karasjok, Finnmark (53.5%; Fig. S3 ).
The Kautokeino site in Finnmark appears to be different from Tibetan sites in terms of gift-giving behavior, with only 22.4% of gifts are being given to non-kin. This may be in part due to the recognition of distantly related herders (r between 0.0078 and 0.0630; Fig. S2 ), which may have occurred because of different data collection techniques in this site (see SI Methods) or due to there being no upper limit on number of gift recipients (see BMethods^). However, the Kautokeino data focused specifically on cooperation in winter siidas, which tend to be smaller and more family-oriented groups (Paine 1994) .
Across all study sites in both regions, relatedness and herding group co-membership positively predicted gift-giving, while the interaction term was negative ( Fig. 1 and Tables S3  and S4 ). The mean number of people in the Tibetan herding groups ranged from 3.98 (± 1 standard deviation [SD] = 4.26) to 12.46 (SD = 18.05) and in the Saami herding groups ranged from 5.71 (SD = 3.33) to 8.33 (SD = 4.72). There were no differences in mean group relatedness between the sites (Table 1) . Taken together, the predicted probabilities of giftgiving as relatedness and group membership co-vary reveal similarities and differences within and between countries (Fig. 2) . Across sites, members of the same herding group were more likely to receive gifts compared to people belonging to other groups. In the two sites in Finnmark, herders preferred to give gifts to members of their herding group regardless of relatedness, although closer kin in the same siida were most likely to receive gifts. This pattern matches district-level evidence that kinship structures reindeer herders' cooperation and productivity (Naess et al. 2010 , Naess 2012 .
Non-kin and distant kin in the QTP sites were more likely to receive gifts if they belonged to the same herding group as the giver. Tibetan herders were slightly more likely to give gifts to close kin belonging to other herding groups (Fig. 2) . As in previous cross-cultural studies of cooperation (Henrich et al. 2005; Lamba and Mace 2011; Wu et al. 2015) , there was more variance between sites than within, and in this case, there was little variation between individuals within sites (Tables 2  and S5 ). In the best-fitting model (Fig. 1) , 46.4% of the variance was explained by the between-site differences in the interaction between relatedness and herding group membership, while the varying slopes for relatedness explained a further 24.2% (Tables 2 and S5) . In a null model with only varying intercepts for egos nested in sites, 85.5% of the variance was explained by differences between sites (Table S5) . Overall, there were no systematic biases in parameter estimates or variances across sites (Fig. 1) . Despite being given anonymously, gifts were reciprocated at higher rates than expected by chance, especially among herders in the two sites in Finnmark, where 26.32-28.17% Fig. 2 Log-odds from the bestfitting multilevel logistic model predicting gift-giving; this model contains varying intercepts and varying slopes (Table S3) . Points show medians, colored by study site; thick lines are 80% credible intervals and thin lines are 95% credible intervals. Top panel shows varying intercepts for each site (intercepts for individuals within sites not shown); remaining panels show slopes for each predictor, varying by site. Gray dotted line represents no effect; each parameter estimate was statistically distinguishable from log odds = 0. Parameter estimates and variances are shown in Table S3 . Fig. S4 shows predictions from this model Parentheses show standard deviations of the variance estimates; note that this was not calculated for the population average intercept, as this was a logistic regression without an error term of gifts were reciprocated (Fig. S4) . There was strong assortment on gift-giving within herding groups, with assortativity coefficients ranging from 0.56 to 0.82 in Finnmark and from 0.26 to 0.61 in QTP. Participants did not preferentially give gifts to same-sex herders in most of the study sites, with the exception of Jilehe and Tawa in QTP; in these two sites, annual average income per household is lower compared to other sites in China. In the two Saami sites, the lack of assortment on sex is likely due to male bias as a consequence of most licensed herders being male.
Measures of indirect connections were not associated with herd sizes (Table S2 ), suggesting that direct social bonds (i.e., gifts, in this case) are more important for pastoralist cooperation than how herders are connected to third parties and beyond.
In the four Tibetan sites, modularity was higher than expected by chance, implying a stronger community structure featuring dense clusters of individuals giving gifts to one another (Fig. S4) . In Karasjok, modularity was slightly lower than expected by chance, with only 4.9% of the randomly generated modularity scores being less than the observed modularity; modularity scores in Kautokeino were indistinguishable from chance. This suggests more instances of cooperation between clusters of herders in Finnmark compared to QTP, potentially resulting from increased interdependence due to larger per-capita herds operating in a more spatially constrained environment.
Herd sizes are different between the two countries, on average, where Saami pastoralists kept larger herds compared to people on the QTP (Fig. S5) . We use Gini coefficients, a commonly used measure of wealth inequality, to investigate the inequality in herd sizes (Levine 2015) . Gini coefficients are higher within the Tibetan sites (range 0.385-0.454) than within Finnmark (range 0.257-0.292); Tibetan Gini coefficients are slightly lower (i.e., higher equality) than reported by Levine (Levine 2015) . Across different herding groups in the Tibetan sites, herders receiving more gifts had belowaverage herd sizes (Figs. 3 and S6) , indicating that gifts tended to go to poorer herders, contrary to patterns observed among East African pastoralists, who gave gifts to wealthier social partners (Glowacki et al. 2016 ). This pattern was not associated with age ( Fig. S6 and Table S2 ) and it was likely driven by the Tibetan herders' general preference to give gifts to poorer herders, as stated during their interviews. In contrast, there is no association between gifts and herd size in either of the Saami sites. Between-subject differences accounted for almost all variance in predicting herd size (99.6%); there was almost no variation between sites (0.4%; Fig. S7 ).
We also investigated the stated reasons for giving gift to each particular person in the gift game. For Saami reindeer herders, 34% of the gifts were given for reasons of Bcurrent or future reciprocity^; giving to Bgood herders^(18%) was also a common reason (Thomas et al. 2015) . BGood herders^in this case means being experienced and respected herders from their local point of view. Very few of Saami herders reported that they will give to the poor (3%) or to family (16%). Among Tibetan herders, the most popular reason for giving gifts was BFamily^(32%); 22% of gift givers also reported that the recipients were poorer than themselves, and they gave gifts as a donation (see Table 3 for the full text of self-report reasons of giving gifts in the two countries). Only 11% of stated reasons were for reciprocity. In short, siida members were more likely to report that they preferred to give because of the potential for future reciprocity compared to the Tibetan herders (see Table S6 , chi-square = 11.51, df = 2, P = 0.003).
Discussion
Through analyzing the social networks that emerged from allocation decisions in an economic game, we found that although most variation in gift-giving occurred between sites, there were comparable patterns within the same country as well as broad similarities regardless of study site. Pastoralists strongly depended on members of their herding groups, especially close relatives. Tibetan herders in China were more likely to give gifts to their close relatives who might not live in the same herding group compared to reindeer herders in Norway. In pastoralist societies, family members can be spread over great distances meaning that it is difficult to provision these kin, especially in harsh environments where the chance of daily interaction is small. Among Tibetan herders, close kin in the same herding group are geographically and psychologically close and may be considered members of the same household who might be supported by other means. A similar result was also found in a hunter-gather group where sharing within the same camp was not very frequent (Marlowe 2004) . Fig. 3 Predicted herd size (standardized) from number of gifts received (in-degree in the gift network) for males (green) and females (blue) in Tibetan pastoralists. The model was fitted on the subset of 1071 herders for whom we had information about age, sex, and herd size. See BMethods^for model specification and Table S2 for the candidate set of models. Lines show parameter estimate medians and shaded ribbons are 95% credible intervals. See Table 1 for standard deviations in herd size to ease interpretation of these z scores Overall, herders rely on a combination of kin (Naess et al. 2010 ) and the social institution of their herding group, as reflected by their gift-giving decisions. Saami reindeer herders indicated that they preferred to give more because of expected Bcurrent or future reciprocity,^while Tibetan yak herders reported that they preferred to give gifts to Bfamily members.Ŝ elf-report data are widely used by demographers, psychologists, and other social scientists as a direct and simple way to understand people's preferences and/or local norms, although sometimes people say one thing while doing another (Du and Mace 2018; Thomas et al. 2018) .
Due to the nature of conducting gift games over long periods of time, we cannot be completely sure that at least some of the reciprocity observed was not due to participants arranging, outside of the game, to give gifts to one another (Wiessner 2009; Gervais 2017) . Even if such behavior occurred, the games would still be collecting information about real-world relationships and thus would be indicative of important instances of reciprocity.
Sociality arises when there are more benefits than costs to living in a group. The relations between different dyads living in the group can be represented as a social network. Social networks evolve when individuals can balance their costs and benefits in order to maximize their fitness. Smith et al. (2016) show that the likelihood of reciprocal cooperation is more frequent in stable hunter-gatherer communities than in more unstable bands; in the less stable environment, demand-sharing and tolerated theft occur more often. Here, the social and economic situation is different in two pastoralist societies, where reindeer herders in Norway live in a more stable and economically better environment compared to the Tibetan herders in China who are living in less developed conditions. Keeping stable relationships with kin and non-kin in the same herding group will help secure their livelihood. Our results also show that, among Tibetan herders, cooperation is more kin-based. Giving gifts as a donation was also important for Tibetan pastoralists but not for Saami herders. Showing generosity might be an important strategy in cooperation because it increases social status while, at the same time, increasing the chance of receiving more help if in need (Gurven et al. 2000) . We also argue that people tend to show they are generous so that everyone else in the group will know their prosocial tendencies, helping them gain higher social status. In addition, Tibetans are Buddhist, where teachings advocate generous behavior; even, or perhaps especially, in religious communities, costly acts can be acts of status enhancement (Power 2016).
Future research should tie in observational measures of cooperation-especially costly forms of cooperation, such as labor investment-as well as measures of reproductive success to produce a more comprehensive evolutionary account of social behavior in pastoralist societies. Beyond pastoralism, our results have relevance for the role of social institutions, population structure, and the multilevel organization of human communities in shaping observed similarities and variation across cultural groups.
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